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The plaintiff/appellant, Nicholas Lamarr, pursuant to Rule 
24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the 
following Reply Brief. This brief replies to the appeal briefs of 
both the appellee Utah State Department of Transportation ("UDOT") 
and the appellee Salt Lake City ("City"). 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On April 18, 1987, Lamarr was severely injured in an 
automobile/pedestrian accident on the North Temple Overpass 
("Overpass") in Salt Lake City. (R. 2-7). 
2. On January 11, 1988, the City was served with a Notice of 
Claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11. (R. 126-127, 190). 
3. On January 11, 1988, UDOT was served with a Notice of Claim 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11. (R. 126-127, 191). 
4. On February 5, 1988, the City denied Lamarr's claim, 
sending a copy of that denial letter to the Attorney General's 
office. (R. 192). The Attorney General's office received that 
letter. (R. 129). 
5. On May 20, 1988, Lamarr filed his Complaint in this case. 
(R. 2-7). 
6. On June 16, 1988, UDOT filed its Answer to Lamarr's 
Complaint. (R. 24-28). 
7. UDOT raised twelve affirmative defenses to Lamarr's 
Complaint. (R. 24-28). 
8. The failure to satisfy the notice of claim requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 was not raised by UDOT as an affirmative 
defense to Lamarr's Complaint. (R. 24-28). 
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9. For two years after answering Lamarr's Complaint, UDOT was 
involved in discovery, including, among other things, sending out 
two sets of interrogatories to Lamarr (R. 29, 81), sending out one 
set of requests for production of documents to Lamarr (R. 29) , 
responding to Salt Lake City's interrogatories (R. 89), responding 
to Lamarr's first and second requests for production of documents 
(R. 263-264), and moving for and filing a third-party complaint 
against Don Ainsworth. (R. 61-63). 
10. At no time before filing its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
just eight weeks before trial and after over two years of 
litigation, did UDOT claim that Lamarr had failed to satisfy the 
notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
(R. 118-125). 
11. Notices of claim served upon the Attorney General's office 
are filed with that office and, at times, forwarded to the Office 
of Risk Management. The governmental agency against whom the claim 
is filed, or the Office of Risk Management, conducts the 
investigation into the facts underlying the claim. Until a formal 
complaint is filed, the Attorney General's office does not 
investigate facts surrounding the underlying claim. (R. 203-204). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Replying to UDOT's Point I) 
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM ISSUE RAISED BY UDOT IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL 
Lamarr acknowledges that the notice of claim issue was briefed 
and appears in the trial court pleadings. That issue was not, 
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however, submitted to the trial court for decision. After deciding 
the four specific issues designated as the issues on appeal in the 
Docketing Statement filed in this case, the trial court asked 
UDOT's counsel "Do you want to address the area as far as the 
immunity statute you raised? (R. 284, p.39). UDOT's lawyer 
responded: "Your Honor, with the understanding that the case is 
being dismissed in toto, I don't believe that would be necessary." 
UDOT's counsel went on to state that if Lamarr appealed, he thought 
UDOT would have the right to raise that issue on appeal "if needed 
as a fall back position". (R. 284, p.39). UDOT's counsel stating, 
in the trial court, that the issue is preserved for appeal doesn't 
mean it is. 
This Court has stated that "issues not presented to the trial 
court for decision are not reviewable by this court, and we express 
no opinion on the issue." Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 857 
(Utah 1984). The Utah Court of Appeals has similarly stated "when 
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, this Court will not undertake to 
consider the issue on appeal." Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
UDOT's counsel did not preserve the notice of claim issue for 
appeal simply by stating in the trial court record that he would be 
able to raise that issue on appeal. To preserve that issue on 
appeal requires compliance with the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. A plaintiff can make all the statements she wants in a 
trial court record that she intends to preserve issues for appeal, 
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but if she does not file a notice of appeal within thirty days 
after the entry of the final order, those appeal issues are lost. 
The Order of Dismissal in this case mentioned nothing about the 
notice of claim issue because it was never presented to the trial 
court. (R. 287-290). By raising the notice of claim issue on 
appeal, UDOT is essentially attacking that judgment for not 
including that issue. As a general rule, one who acquiesces in a 
judgment cannot later attack it. Trees v. Lewis. 738 P.2d 612, 613 
(Utah 1987); Cinqolani v. Utah Power and Light Co, 790 P.2d 1219, 
1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Having acquiesced in the trial court's judgment that did not 
address the notice of claim issue, UDOT cannot now raise that issue 
on appeal. Additionally, to raise that issue on appeal, UDOT, as 
Lamarr, would have to follow the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
No cross-appeal was filed by UDOT to preserve that issue on appeal. 
Just as Lamarr is required to follow the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to preserve his issues on ctppeal, UDOT is also required 
to preserve its issues on appeal under the rules governing cross-
appeal. That wasn't done in this case and the notice of claim 
issue is lost to UDOT on appeal. 
POINT II 
(Replying to UDOT's Point I) 
UDOT HAS WAIVED ANY AFFIRMATIVE! DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM BECAUSE 
THAT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WAS NOT RAISED IN UDOT'S ANSWER 
Point II of this Reply Brief is to be addressed only if this 
Court rejects Point I of this Brief. 
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Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively. . . statute of 
limitations . . . and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. 
Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). 
Because an affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of 
Lamarr's prima facia case, matters constituting such affirmative 
defenses must be pleaded. Failure to so plead constitutes waiver 
of that affirmative defense under Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Pratt v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986). 
UDOT raised twelve separate defenses in its Answer to Lamarr's 
Complaint. UDOT did not raise as an affirmative defense Lamarr's 
failure to file the statutorily required notice of claim with the 
Attorney General or the statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-12. Nowhere in its Answer does UDOT mention the terms 
"notice of claim", "statute of limitations", or "Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-12." As such, that affirmative defense is waived. 
UDOT may attempt to argue that its Seventh Defense is 
sufficient to raise the notice of claim/statute of limitations 
defense. UDOT's Seventh Defense reads as follows: 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with 
appropriate provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, including §63-30-
19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that he has not obtained an appropriate bond 
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for each of the governmental entities named as 
defendants. (R. 26-27). 
While it is clear that this defense was aimed at the cost bond 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-19, UDOT may try to argue that 
the language "plaintiff has failed to comply with appropriate 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act" is sufficient to 
cover the notice of claim/statute of limitations provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-12. If UDOT attempts to argue that, UDOT is 
wrong. 
Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
In pleading the statute of limitations it is 
not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense, but it may be alleged generally that 
the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, referring 
to or describing such statute specifically and 
definitely by section number, subsection 
designation if any, or otherwise designating 
the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly 
to identify it. (emphasis added). 
Even if UDOT had raised a general plea of "statute of 
limitations", which it didn't, that plea would be insufficient and 
inadequate to raise the affirmative defense under Rule 9(h). 
Wasatch Mines Company v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007, 
1010-11(1970). As stated by this Court in American Theatre Co. v. 
Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922, 923(1938): 
The statute of limitations is a defense in 
bar, and in most cases must be affirmatively 
alleged or pleaded or it is waived, or if the 
lapse of the statutory period appears on the 
face of the complaint, the matter may be 
raised by demurrer. In either event, the 
section of the statute applicable must be 
specifically pleaded. (Citation omitted). It 
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follows that if the section pleaded is not 
applicable it does not avail defendant that 
the action may be barred by another section 
not pleaded, (emphasis added). 
UDOT did not specifically plead an inapplicable statute of 
limitations, as was the case in American Theatre. UDOT simply did 
not plead the statute of limitations/notice of claim defense at 
all. That defense is waived. UDOT wants Lamarr's claim dismissed 
based on a hypertechnical reading of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Actf while being allowed to disregard the basic principles of 
pleading under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. UDOT should not 
be allowed to have it both ways. 
POINT III 
(Replying to UDOT's Point I) 
IF THIS COURT REJECTS POINTS I AND II OF THE BRIEF, THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS, NONETHELESS, COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE OF 
CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30-12. 
Point III is to be addressed only if this Court rejects Points 
I and II of this Brief. 
UDOT does not argue that Lamarr is guilty of no compliance 
with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. 
UDOT acknowledges that a timely notice of claim was filed with 
UDOT. UDOT argues defective compliance with the statute because of 
Lamarr's failure to file a second notice of claim with the Attorney 
General. While UDOT cites a couple of trial court opinions to 
support its position, those trial court decisions are not binding 
precedent or authority for this Court. As will be shown, those 
trial court decisions are also factually distinguishable. 
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UDOT does not cite one binding Utah Supreme Court or Utah 
Court of Appeals decision to support its position that two separate 
notices of claim must be filed in this case. Every decision cited 
by UDOT in its Brief deals with a situation where no timely notice 
of claim was filed against the governmental entity. Lamarr 
concedes that if no timely notice of claim is filed against a 
governmental entity, the claim must be dismissed. That's not the 
case here. 
UDOT was served with a timely notice of claim by Lamarr. (R. 
126-127, 191). UDOT does not argue that that notice of claim was 
untimely or defective in form or content. At the same time, Lamarr 
served the required notice of claim on the City. (R. 126-127, 
190). On February 5, 1988, within one year after Lamarr's accident, 
the City's attorney sent a letter to Lamarr's lawyer acknowledging 
receipt of the notice of claim against the City and denying the 
claim, stating that the area where the accident happened was owned 
and maintained by the State of Utah. (R. 192). A copy of that 
letter was sent to the Attorney General's office. The Attorney 
General's office has acknowledged receipt of that letter. (R. 129, 
paragraph 4). 
Decisions of this Court and the statutes of Utah show that, 
under these circumstances, Lamarr has satisfied the notice of claim 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed as no application to the statutes of 
this state. The statutes establish the laws 
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of the state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all 
proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. 
This rule of construction applies to statutory notice 
requirements. As stated by this Court in Galleqos v. Midvale, 27 
Utah 2d, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972) , the notice requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act are designed to "alert the public 
authorities so that a proper and timely investigation of the claim 
can be made." Id. at 1337. UDOT cannot argue that that purpose was 
not accomplished in this case. As stated by Leonard McGee, a former 
Assistant Attorney Generalf in his Affidavit presented to the trial 
court, when a notice of claim is served upon the Attorney General's 
office, it is filed and, at times, referred to the Office of Risk 
Management. The actual investigation is done by Risk Management or 
the underlying agency against whom the claim has been filed. The 
Attorney General's office does not conduct any investigation and 
has no further involvement in the claim until the actual complaint 
is filed. The purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied by 
filing the claim with the underlying agency doing the 
investigation. (R. 203-204). 
The trial court decisions cited by UDOT, in support of a two 
notice requirement, deal with situations where the Attorney 
General's office was served with a notice, but no notice was served 
upon the underlying agency. For the reason stated above, that is 
a situation where the purposes of the statute might be circumvented 
because the underlying agency doing the investigation did not 
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receive notice. That is not the case here. The underlying agency 
with investigative authority over this claim was timely served with 
a notice of claim. The purpose of the statute has been satisfied. 
UDOT's only remaining argument is for a hypertechnical reading 
of the statute which has no practical relation to the purpose of 
the notice requirement. UDOT might argue that the purpose of the 
statute is to give the Attorney General's office notice of the 
claim, as the agency's legal representative, even though that 
office is not responsible for the investigation. If that is UDOT's 
argument, that purpose was satisfied by the City's written notice 
of February 5, 1988, received by the Attorney General's office 
within one year of Lamarr's injury. UDOT is wrong when it states 
that the only document Lamarr can rely on to satisfy the statute is 
the single notice of claim filing with UDOT. 
UDOT's hypertechnical reading of the statute is not supported 
by decisions of this Court. In Tooele Meat and Storage Co. v. 
Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, 966 (1913), this Court acknowledged 
that "the general rule with respect to notices is that mere 
informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do not mislead, 
and give the necessary information to the proper parties." The Utah 
Supreme Court case which most closely addresses the circumstances 
of this action is Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 
213 (1924). While this is an old case decided under former law, 
the principles still apply to this case and this is still binding 
precedent. In Hurley, the guardians of an eight-year old minor 
brought an action to recover for injuries sustained by the 
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plaintiff on one of the streets of the town of Bingham. Before 
pursuing a claim against the municipality, the plaintiff was 
required to file a statutory notice of claim. In the course of its 
opinion, this Court made these observations applicable to this 
case: 
After all, as we conceive the purpose of the 
law, when the injured party has presented his 
claim stating the time, place, cause and 
circumstances of his injury and the extent of 
his damage is as far as known to him, he has 
fairly and fully complied with the spirit and 
intent of the statute. But this is far from 
excusing the failure to present any claim at 
all within the limit fixed by law. There is a 
wide distinction between presenting a 
defective claim which at least names the 
place, time, and circumstances of the injury 
and in presenting no claim at all. In the 
first supposed case the municipality is at 
least notified sufficiently to investigate the 
merits of the claim, which, evidently, is the 
main purpose of the statute. In the second 
supposed case the city receives no notice at 
all, and the very purpose of the statute is 
defeated. 
Id. at 214-15. 
That is the same situation we have in this case. Every appellate 
court decision cited by UDOT in its Brief deals with a situation 
where no timely notice of claim was filed. That is not the case 
here. The most UDOT can argue is that this is a technically 
defective filing by Lamarr by not sending a second notice of claim 
with the Attorney General's office. As stated in Hurley, however, 
that is not a defect which should defeat the claim. The purposes 
of the statute, in notifying UDOT of this claim so that UDOT may 
timely investigate, has been satisfied. Under those circumstances, 
11 
as stated in Hurley. Lamarr has "fairly and fully complied with the 
spirit and intent of the statute." 
If this Court rejects Points I and II of this Brief, Lamarr 
has, nonetheless, complied with the notice of claim requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. 
POINT IV 
(Replying to UDOT's Point I) 
UDOT HAS WAIVED COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30-12. 
Point IV is to be considered only if this Court rejects Points 
I, II, and III of this Brief. UDOT, by its conduct in the liti-
gation of this case, has waived compliance with the notice of claim 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 and is now estopped from 
raising it as a defense to Lamarr's claim. 
Contrary to what UDOT claims, statutes of limitations are not 
jurisdictional and can be waived. American Coal Co v. Sandstrom, 
689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). It is well settled that a person or 
entity, by its conduct, may be estopped from relying on the notice 
of claim defense. Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159(1969). 
This accident happened over three and a half years ago. The 
underlying case was in litigation for over two years. The facts 
surrounding Lamarr's filing of the respective notices of claim were 
available to UDOT before the complaint was filed. Trial was 
scheduled for October 9, 1990, just eight weeks after UDOT filed 
its motion for summary judgment, raising the notice of claim issue 
for the first time. Throughout two years of litigation, UDOT 
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proceeded as though Lamarr had complied with the notice of claim 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. UDOT sent out two sets 
of interrogatories to Lamarr, one set of requests for production of 
documents to Lamarr, moved to file a third-party complaint, 
responded to discovery submitted by Lamarr and by the City. 
Depositions were taking place and UDOT was responding to Lamarr1s 
additional discovery requests. Under all of those circumstances, 
decisions of this Court support that even assuming, without 
admitting, that Lamarr's notice of claim was technically defective, 
UDOT has waived that defect. As stated by this Court in Bowman v. 
Qqden City, 93 P. 561, 564 (Utah 1908): 
The plaintiff's claim was not properly made 
out as provided by the statute in several 
particulars, principally because it was not 
verified, and the extent of his injury or 
damage not sufficiently described. The city 
council, however, did not decline to consider 
it, nor to investigate the facts, because the 
claim was not properly made out. On the 
contrary it treated the claim, and acted upon 
it, as though it had been in full compliance 
with the statute. In such case the defects of 
the claim presented were waived, and were not 
thereafter available as a defense to the 
action. 
For those same reasons if this Court rejects Points I, II, and 
Point III of this Brief, any technical defects in Lamarr's compli-
ance with the notice of claim provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
12 have been waived by UDOT. 
POINT V 
(Replying to UDOT's Point III) 
THE ISSUE OF UDOT'S DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
PRESENTED TO TRIAL COURT, IS PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL, AND SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT 
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In Point III of its Brief, UDOT argues that it had no duty to 
Lamarr. That issue was never raised in the trial court. That 
issue is presented for the first time on appeal. This Court will 
not address issues presented for the first time on appeal. 
That UDOT's duty to the plaintiff was never addressed by the 
trial court is clearly established by the trial court record. UDOT 
initially filed a motion for summary judgment on the notice of 
claim/statute of limitations issue. (R. 118-141). As was discus-
sed in Point I, that issue was never presented to nor decided by 
the trial court. The City then filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the following four grounds (R. 144-152): 
1. That the City owed no general duty to Lamarr for the 
construction, maintenance and/or signing of the Overpass; 
2. Thcit the City owed no private duty to Lamarr for transient 
control; 
3. That Lamarr failed to establish that the conduct of the 
City was a proximate cause of Lamarr's injuries; 
4. Thcit highway maintenance and police activities are immune 
discretionary functions under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (l)(a). 
After the City filed its motion for summary judgment, UDOT 
filed a supplement motion for summary judgment, joining the City in 
ground three and part of ground four, of the City's motion, the 
proximate cause and highway maintenance discretionary function 
issues. (R. 156-157). 
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The proximate cause issue was decided in favor of UDOT and the 
City. The highway maintenance discretionary function issue was 
decided against UDOT and the City. (R. 287-290). 
As argued in Point I of this Brief, UDOT's notice of 
claim/statute of limitations issue is not properly before this 
Court. UDOT did not cross-appeal on the highway maintenance 
discretionary function issue. Therefore, as stated by Lamarr on 
page 19 of his initial Appeal Brief, "the only issue on appeal, as 
to UDOT, is whether UDOT's conduct in the construction, mainten-
ance, and/or signing of the Overpass was, as a matter of law, a 
proximate cause of Lamarr's injuries." In addition to the notice 
of claim issue, UDOT now attempts to throw the issue of whether 
UDOT had a duty to Lamarr into the appeal. That issue was never 
even briefed in the trial court. This is clear from the record. 
After the trial court's ruling from the bench on UDOT's and 
the City's motions for summary judgment, counsel for UDOT prepared 
a proposed Order of Dismissal. Counsel for UDOT included some 
language in that proposed Order of Dismissal regarding UDOT's 
specific and general duties to Lamarr. (R. 267-270). Lamarr filed 
a timely objection to that proposed Order of Dismissal, stating in 
part: 
The plaintiff objects to any conclusion of law 
which goes beyond those specific issues which 
were presented to the trial court for 
resolution. Specifically, the plaintiff 
objects to that portion of the Order which 
addresses whether UDOT had a general or 
specific (public or private) duty to sign the 
highway in question to prohibit pedestrian 
traffic. That specific issue was not before 
the Court. (R. 271-274). 
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In a minute entry dated November 1, 1990f the trial court 
stated "plaintiff's objection to Proposed Order of Dismissal dated 
and signed by the Court on October 10r 1990 is granted. Objection 
was timely and Order was signed in error." (R. 277). Thereafter, 
Lamarr's counsel prepared the Order of Dismissal which constitutes 
the final order in this case. That Order of Dismissal, approp-
riately , mentions nothing about UDOT's duty, either public or 
private, to Lamarr. (R. 287-290). 
There is no issue before this Court regarding UDOT's duty to 
Lamarr. Point III of UDOT's Brief should be disregarded. 
POINT VI 
(Replying to the City's Point I) 
THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
FERRE SHOULD BE REEXAMINED. 
In Point I of its Brief, the City addresses the "public duty" 
doctrine outlined in Ferre v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1989). Lamarr addresses that doctrine in detail in Point II of his 
initial Briejf and will not restate those arguments here. 
The flciw in the reasoning in the Ferre case is in addressing 
the duty issue in a vacuum without reference to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("Act"). Under the Act, the scope of the 
duty of the governmental entity varies depending on whether 
immunity from suit under the Act has been waived. As stated in the 
last sentence of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4(1): 
Where immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted and 
liability of the entity shall be determined as 
if the entity were a private person. 
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Courts construing similar provisions have concluded that that 
provision means that where immunity from suit is waived, the 
governmental entity is to be treated as an individual and the 
public duty doctrine does not apply, as the public duty doctrine 
only applies to governmental entities, not individuals. As stated 
in Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-242 (Alaska 1976): 
Where there is no immunity, the state is to be 
treated like a private litigant. To allow the 
public duty doctrine to disturb this equality 
would create immunity where the legislature 
has not. 
The bottom line of all of this is that in order to determine 
the scope of the duty of the governmental entity, including whether 
the public duty doctrine may apply, it is necessary to determine 
whether or not immunity from suit against the governmental entity 
has been waived. If immunity from suit has been waived, the 
governmental entity is treated as an individual and the public duty 
doctrine does not apply. If immunity from suit has not been 
waived, the governmental entity is not treated as a private 
litigant and, depending on the circumstances, the public duty 
doctrine may apply. The Ferre decision prevents that proper 
analysis of a governmental entity's duty by requiring a duty 
analysis totally independent of the provisions of the Act. This 
Court should take this opportunity to reexamine the Ferre decision 
to make it consistent with the terms of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act and require the determination of a governmental 
entity's immunity from suit before determining the scope of that 
governmental entity's duty. That order of analysis is necessary to 
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give any meaning to the last sentence of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
4(1). 
In response to the City's claim that Lamarr claims that no 
special duty exists in this case, Lamarr restated the arguments of 
his initial Brief that the City has a non-delegable duty to 
maintain its streets in a safe condition and to guard against 
injury to individuals. Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 
p. 373 (1909). Lamarr reemphasizes that an exception to the public 
duty doctrine applies if a statute evidence is a clear intent to 
identify a particular and circumscribed class of persons within the 
general public. Champagne v. Spokane Humane Society, 47 Wash App. 
887, 737 P2d 1279 (1987). Lamarr argues that Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-8 and -9 evidence an intent to protect individual injured by 
defective, unsafe or dangerous conditions of highways, public 
structures and their appurtenances. As such, the public duty 
doctrine do€*s not apply. 
Finally, the City's footnote that the transients congregating 
under the Overpass have as much right as Lamarr, and simply can't 
be herded by the City, is false. In his deposition, City police 
officer Norman Thompson discussed the almost annual "herding" of 
the transients from under various overpasses in the City, sometimes 
by using trucks and even bulldozers. (Thompson depo, p. 14-19). 
For these reasons, and the reasons stated in Lamarr's initial 
Brief, the public duty doctrine does not apply to this case. 
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POINT VII 
(Replying to UDOT's Point II and the City's Point II) 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, PROXIMATE CAUSATION 
IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
Lamarr's failure to cite Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) and Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985) does nothing to undermine his contention that proximate 
causation in this case is a question for the jury. The elements 
mentioned in Mitchell and Williams, used to determine the issue of 
proximate causation, are all jury questions. As with all jury 
questions, those elements are to be submitted to a jury unless 
reasonable minds could not differ on the evidence presented. Only 
when reasonable minds could not differ on the evidence may a fact 
question be decided as a matter of law. 
In this case, UDOT and the City try to paint an incredibly 
complex, convoluted, and "bizarre" chain of events that nobody in 
their right mind could foresee. That's just not the case. It is 
very reasonable for a jury to believe that the failure of the City 
to control the transient population under the Overpass and the 
failure of UDOT and the City to properly construct, maintain and 
sign the Overpass was a proximate cause of Lamarr's injuries. 
The transient problem under the Overpass was a recurring and 
known problem to the City police. That is clearly established by 
the deposition testimony of Norman C. Thompson, a police officer 
with the City. On page 11 of his deposition, Officer Thompson 
states: 
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Question: Would you characterize the 
transient problem under the North Temple 
Overpass as a continuing problem? Answer: 
It's crabgrass is probably the best term to 
use. It is a habitual problem. It's been-
it' s been present most of the - most of my 
career along, as I said, about 4th West, 5th 
West, under the viaducts, along that area, for 
a number of years. It has been a recurring 
problem. 
The pedestrian walkway on the Overpass extends only halfway 
across the Overpass and then drops pedestrians right into the 
middle of the transient population. That's what happened to 
Lamarr. To get from west to east across the Overpass, Lamarr had 
to either go back into the transient population, walk many blocks 
out of his way, or walk across the Overpass itself. There were no 
signs or markers prohibiting pedestrian traffic on the Overpass. 
UDOT and the City continue to argue that Lamarr was 
"illegally" on the Overpass. There was nothing illegal about it. 
There were no signs prohibiting pedestrian traffic on the Overpass. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-82 states, in pertinent part: 
(3) where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is 
available, a pedestrian walking along or upon 
a highway shall walk as near as practicable to 
an outside edge of the roadway, and if on a 
two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left 
side of the roadway. 
The Overpass was a two-way roadway with no sidewalk or shoulder. 
Lamarr was walking on the left side of the roadway. He was not jay-
walking nor trespassing. 
Under those circumstances, it cannot be said, as a matter of 
law, that the City's failure to control the transient population 
under the Overpass and UDOT's and the City's failure to properly 
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maintain, construct, and sign the Overpass were not a proximate 
cause of Lamarr's injuries. It is reasonably foreseeable that a 
pedestrian harassed by the transients under the Overpass would not 
return to that same area, but would attempt to cross the Overpass, 
seeing no signs prohibiting pedestrian travel on the Overpass. 
As stated by the City in its brief, in Mitchell there was a 
"lack of any evidence linking Mitchell's death with the hotel's 
allegedly inadequate security." While UDOT and the City challenge 
the strength of Lamarr's evidence and arguments, it cannot be said 
that there is no evidence that such an accident on the Overpass may 
be reasonably foreseeable. 
As stated in the venerable Palsqraff case cited by the City: 
It was not necessary that the defendant should 
have notice of the particular method in which 
an accident would occur, if the possibility of 
an accident was clear to the ordinary prudent 
eye. 
Palsqraff v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 
99, 100 (1928). 
For these reasons, the issue of proximate causation in this 
case is one for the jury. 
POINT VIII 
(Replying to the City's Point III) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CITY'S DUTY 
TO CONTROL THE TRANSIENT POPULATION UNDER THE OVERPASS IS 
AN IMMUNE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
Lamarr claims that the City's failure to control the transient 
problem under the Overpass created a defective, unsafe, and/or 
dangerous condition of the Overpass. As such, Lamarr claims that 
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the City's immunity from suit is specifically waived under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-8 and Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9. The City counters 
by saying that these sections provide a limited immunity waiver for 
physical conditions which make the roadway itself dangerous. The 
City then cites a number of cases from Utah and surrounding 
jurisdictions which deal with construction defects or defects in 
the road itself. 
The City states that "the City has found no case, and Lamarr 
has cited none, where human conditions under an Overpass have been 
held to make* the overpass itself defective." Similarly, the City 
has not cited one case to support its position that a defect and/or 
dangerous condition caused by a recurring human problem under an 
overpass is not a dangerous or defective condition causing injury 
for which immunity has been waived. Admittedly, this is an unusual 
fact situation. Just because this situation hasn't been addressed 
by the courts doesn't mean that Lamarr's theory should fail. 
Admittedly the sorts of defects cited in the cases listed by the 
City were held to be the sorts of defects for which immunity from 
suit has been waived. Nothing in those cases, however, discounts 
or undermines Lamarr's position that the transient population under 
the Overpass may also fall within that definition and may also be 
a defective and/or dangerous condition for which immunity from suit 
is waived. 
In its Point III, the City makes two incorrect statements. 
First, the City states that there is "absolutely no causal 
relationship between the transients below the overpass and the 
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accident on top of the overpass." That whole issue is addressed in 
Point VII of this Brief. While the City may certainly argue to the 
jury that there is no causal relationship between the transients 
and the accident, Lamarr alleges that reasonable minds could differ 
on the causal relationship and that that issue is properly 
submitted to the jury. 
The City next makes the unsupportable statement that "Lamarr 
has made absolutely no allegation that the overpass itself was 
defective in a way that caused the accident." That's silly. 
Paragraph 15 of the plaintiff's complaint provides as follows: 
These governmental defendants were negligent 
in among other things, designing and 
constructing a pedestrian walkway which did 
not extend over the entire Overpass but 
rather, extended only halfway across the 
Overpass and dropped pedestrians off in a 
dangerous and unsafe area known to be a 
gathering place for transients; in failing to 
place and maintain appropriate markers or 
other devices on, or adjacent tof the 
Overpass, prohibiting or regulating pedestrian 
traffic on the overpass; in failing to provide 
a reasonable alternative route for pedestrians 
other than the pedestrian walkway; in failing 
to provide other safety features on the 
Overpass, such as an outside ledge, to prevent 
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. (R. 
5). 
Clearly, these are allegations that go to the defective nature 
of the Overpass itself, defects which Lamarr claims were a 
proximate cause of his injury. For these reasons, Lamarr claims 
that, as to the City, the transient population under the Overpass 
created a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of the Overpass 
and, as such, immunity from suit has been waived under Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-8 and Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9. These specific waivers 
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of immunity override the general "discretionary function" immunity 
of Utah Code Ann* §63-30-10(1)(a). Sanford v. University of Utah, 
26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990). The trial court erred in concluding that 
the City's duty to control the transient population under the 
Overpass is an immune discretionary function. 
POINT IX 
(Replying to the City's Point IV) 
THE CITY'S DUTY HAS BEEN ADDRESSED IN OTHER POINTS OF 
THIS BRIEF. WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND/OR 
SIGNING OF THE OVERPASS IS AN IMMUNE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT 
In Point IV of its Brief, the City argues that its duty under 
Utah Code Ann. §27-14-4(2), allowing it to construct sidewalks and 
pedestrian safety devices, as well as its management of the 
transient problem, are both immune discretionary functions. Lamarr 
has already addressed the management of the transient problem as an 
immune discretionary function in Point IV of his initial Brief and 
in Point VIII of this Brief and will not restate his position here. 
Regarding the City's duty to construct and maintain pedestrian 
safety devices, Lamarr addressed the City's non-delegable common 
law duty to exercise care in maintaining its streets and sidewalks 
in Point II and Point IV of his initial Brief. Lamarr reemphasizes 
the language of the Kansas Supreme Court in Schmeck v. City of 
Shawnee, 651 P.2d 585, 594, (Kan. 1982): 
A city's common law duty to keep its streets 
safe cannot be avoided by alleging the acts 
were discretionary. 
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The City spends most of Point IV stating why any duty to 
construct or maintain safety devices adjacent to state highways is 
an immune discretionary function. Lamarr addressed these issues in 
detail in the trial court in his opposition to the City's and 
UDOT's Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 206-229). The trial court 
ruled on that issue, specifically concluding that "the 
construction, maintenance and signing of the North Temple Overpass 
is not an immune discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(a)." (R. 288). Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985); 
Biqelow v. Inqersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
Neither the City nor UDOT filed a notice o± cross-appeal 
challenging that conclusion by the trial court. This Court has 
stated that subdivision (d) of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of cross-appeal be 
timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack 
the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 
P.2d 506 (Utah 1990). Absent a cross-appeal by either defendant, 
this Court has no jurisdiction to address the issue of whether the 
construction, maintenance, and signing is an immundiscretionary 
function. 
Dated this day of July, 1991. 
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